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We  develop  a method  to evaluate  CDF  considering  failure  correlation  at  multi  units.
We  develop  a procedure  to evaluate  correlation  coefﬁcient  between  multi  components.
We  evaluate  CDF  at  two  different  BWR  units  using  correlation  coefﬁcients.
We  conﬁrm  the  validity  of method  and  correlation  coefﬁcient  through  the evaluation.
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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  Tohoku  earthquake  (Mw9.0)  occurred  on  March  11, 2011  and  caused  a large  tsunami.  The  Fukushima
Daiichi  Nuclear  Power  Plant  with  six  units  were  overwhelmed  by the  tsunami  and  core  damage  occurred.
Authors  proposed  the concept  and  method  for evaluating  core damage  frequency  (CDF)  considering  fail-
ure correlation  at the  multi  units  and  sites.  Based  on  the  above  method,  one  of authors  developed  the
procedure  for evaluating  the  failure  correlation  coefﬁcient  and  response  correlation  coefﬁcient  between
the  multi  components  under  the  strong  seismic  motion.  These  method  and  failure  correlation  coefﬁcients
were  applied  to two different  BWR  units  and  their  CDF  was  evaluated  by seismic  probabilistic  risk  assess-
ment  technology.  Through  this  quantitative  evaluation,  the validity  of  the  method  and  failure correlation
coefﬁcient  was  conﬁrmed.
ublis©  2015  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
The Tohoku earthquake (Mw9.0) occurred at 14:46 on March
1, 2011 and caused a large tsunami. The strong seismic motion
as observed at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (F1-
PP) with six units and reactors were shut down after control rods
ad been inserted. While the reactors were shut down normally,
hey were then overwhelmed by the tsunami about 46 min  after
he earthquake occurred. The various components of the water
ntake system and emergency diesel generators were ﬂooded.
xternal power supply was also lost due to damage by strong seis-
ic  motions and the tsunami. In this situation, station blackout
ccurred. As a consequence, reactor cooling system functions were
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/).hed  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
lost, core damage occurred and radioactive materials were released
to the off-site area (Japanese Government, 2011).
Regarding PRA methodology relating earthquake and earth-
quake induced tsunami, implementation standards considering the
combination of these events are to be developed.
However, in Japan, AESJ at ﬁrst published Seismic PRA imple-
mentation standard (Hirano et al., 2008; Atomic Energy Society of
Japan, 2009). Then tsunami PRA implementation standard (Atomic
Energy Society of Japan, 2011) was  published, referring research
results (Ebisawa et al., 2012a) of tsunami PRA.
Concept of considering combination of seismic and tsunami
events was developed by one of this paper authors after Fukushima
Daiichi (F1-NPP) accident (Ebisawa et al., 2012b). The concept
was referred in revised seismic PRA implementation standard
(Narumiya et al., 2014).And, the current issues related to seismic PRA and tsunami PRA,
based on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident are
methodology for evaluating core damage frequency (CDF) at multi
units and sites.
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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The concerning points related to these issues which crossing
ver plural units and sites are;
1) Correlation of damage between plural components.
2) Damage of shared facilities (sea water supply system, electric
power sharing, off site power supplier, etc.)
3) Human reliability, etc.
In these issues related to the multi units and sites, there are
any studies (Fleming, 1999; Jung, 2003; Fleming, 2005; Hakata,
006; Schroer, 2012; Kawamura, 2014).
In these studies, Fleming (2005) referred about the idea of site
isk metrics instead of the typical CDF and large early release
requency (LERF) characterization. This idea is no simple way  to
anipulate the single-unit PRA to capture risk from multi-unit
lant. Schroer (2012) described about a thorough classiﬁcation of
ulti-unit risk interactions and dependencies, along with the appli-
ation of such categories to the existing methods for multi-unit CDF
valuation.
Kawamura (2014) picked up the issue of human reliability based
n experience in Fukushima Daini NPP at the Tohoku earthquake
nd pointed up the importance of close collaboration between soft-
are and hardware.
On the other hand, authors proposed the concept and method
or evaluating CDF considering failure correlation at the multi units
Fig. 2. (c) Illustration of sea water supply system and situation of tsunami disasterkyo Elec. Power Co., 2011).
and sites (Ebisawa et al., 2012c). Based on the above method, one of
authors developed the procedure for evaluating the failure corre-
lation coefﬁcient and response correlation coefﬁcient between the
multi components under the strong seismic motion (Ebisawa et al.,
2012c). These procedure and failure correlation coefﬁcients were
applied to two  different BWR  units and their CDF was evaluated.
Through this quantitative evaluation, the validity of the method
and failure correlation coefﬁcient was  conﬁrmed.
This paper describes the overview of the F1-NPP accident.
The paper highlights the concept and methodology for evaluating
CDF considering failure correlation at multi units and sites. Fur-
thermore, the paper also refers the evaluation results that these
procedure and failure correlation coefﬁcients were applied to two
different BWR  units.
2. Overview of Fukushima NPP accident and lessons
learned from the accident
2.1. Overview of F1-NPP accident at Tohoku earthquake/tsunami
F1-NPP was overwhelmed by a tsunami about 46 min  after the
earthquake as shown in Fig. 1. The tsunami height was so high that
the experts estimated it to be more than 10 m from a photograph
showing the overﬂow status of tsunami seawall (10 m) in Fig. 1
(Japanese Government, 2011; Ebisawa et al., 2012c; Kameda, 2012).
 at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (by Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 2011).
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As to the sea water pump facilities for component cooling,
ll units were ﬂooded by the tsunami as shown in Fig. 2. The
mergency Diesel Generators and switchboards installed in the
asement ﬂoor of the reactor and the turbine buildings were
ooded except for Unit 6, and the emergency power source sup-
ly was lost (Japanese Government, 2011; Ebisawa et al., 2012c;
ameda, 2012).
On the other hand, operator succeeded to start RCIC and oper-
te controlling residual heat well, however, RCIC stopped to work
fter two days. Cooling systems in FL other than RCIC were not
perated due to a loss of AC power. Failure of reactor core cooling
esulted in core damage in about 5 or 6 h. Temperature and pres-
ure in the primary containment vessel rose up, and radioactive
aterials were released through seals into the power plant and
hen the surrounding area. Consequently, a wide area was contam-
nated by the radioactive materials (Japanese Government, 2011;
bisawa et al., 2012c; Kameda, 2012).
Fig. 4. Outline of seismic PRA.
2.2. Lessons learned from the F1-NPP accident
The current issues of seismic engineering based on lessons
learned from F1-NPP accident are referred as follows (Ebisawa et al.,
2012c);
(i) Occurrence of gigantic main earthquake and tsunami, a com-
bination of seismic hazard and tsunami hazard,
(ii) Consideration of gigantic aftershock and triggered earthquake,
(iii) Core damage over a short period of time based on functional
failure of support systems (seawater supply, power supply and
signal systems),
(iv) Common cause failure of multi structures and components,
(v) Dependency among neighboring units,
(vi) External events risk evaluation at multi units and sites and
(vii) Combined emergency of both natural disaster and the nuclear
accident.
 logic tree.
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in the source models and propagation models of seismic motion asFig. 5. Accident sequence evaluation.
These issues are connected as the following perspectives based
n the above 2.1.2 damage of F1-NPP.
 Weak site protection despite the evidence on the chance of simul-
taneous tsunami and earthquake is corresponded to the above (i)
and (ii).
 Flood damage to safety related switchgears and emergency gen-
erating diesels, which were located in the basement of turbine
buildings as the key cause of Station Blackout to units 1–4 is
corresponded to the (iii).
 Inadequate use of plant-speciﬁc and internal ﬂood PRA to identify
and improve safety vulnerabilities is corresponded to the (iii).
 Inadequate knowledge and awareness about the multi-unit
dependencies and interactions is corresponded to the (iv)–(vi). Insufﬁcient accident management and planning on all the plant
units, as well as government agencies is corresponded to the (vi)
and (vii).
Fig. 6. Examples of location of nu and Design 288 (2015) 82–97 85
The contents related to the issue (iii), (v), (vi) and (vii) are found in
chapters 4 and 5.
3. Outline of seismic PRA
3.1. Seismic PSA Procedure (Atomic Energy Society of Japan,
2009)
The procedure of seismic PRA consists of ﬁve steps as shown in
Fig. 3.
- Step 1: Collection of information related to earthquakes and the
setting of accident scenarios
- Step 2: Seismic hazard evaluation
- Step 3: Fragility evaluation
- Step 4: Accident sequence evaluation
- Step 5: Documentation
In the above procedure, core damage frequency (CDF) is evalu-
ated by the following Eq. (1).
CDF =
∫ ∞
0
(
−dH(∝)
d ∝
)
P(∝)d ∝ (1)
where H(˛) is seismic hazard, P(˛) is core damage probability,  ˛ is
peak ground acceleration at bedrock.
3.2. Collection of information related to earthquake and setting of
accident scenario (Atomic Energy Society of Japan, 2009)
The collection of information related to earthquakes and the
setting of accident scenarios is shown in Fig. 3. First, relevant infor-
mation should be gathered. Then, a “plant walk-down” based on the
gathered information should be conducted. Finally, various acci-
dent scenarios based on gathered relevant information and results
of the “plant walk-down” should be set.
3.3. Seismic hazard evaluation (Atomic Energy Society of Japan,
2009)
The evaluation of the seismic hazard should be considered
“aleatory uncertainty” and “epistemic uncertainty”. The former
derives from phenomenology and the latter derives from a lack
of recognition and information. The epistemic uncertainties existdescribed above. Evaluation of epistemic uncertainty is conducted
by using a logic tree (LT) with this epistemic uncertainty as a target
as shown in Fig. 4.
clear power plants at Japan.
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.4. Fragility evaluation (Atomic Energy Society of Japan, 2009)
The fragility F(˛) of component is evaluated by the following Eq.
2).
(˛) =
∫ ∞
0
fR(˛, xR)
(∫ xR
0
fC(x)dx
)
dxR (2)
where fR(˛,xR) is realistic response of component represented
s logarithmic normal distribution (median MR(˛), logarithmic
tandard deviation ˇR) by the following Eq. (3). fR(˛,xR) is capac-
ty of component represented as logarithmic normal distribution
median MC, logarithmic standard deviation ˇC) by the following
q. (4).  ˛ is peak ground acceleration of seismic motion at bedrock.
R(˛, xR) =
1√
2ˇRx
exp
{
−1
2
(
ln(x/MR(˛))
ˇR
)2}
(3)C(x) =
1√
2ˇCx
exp
{
−1
2
(
ln (x/MC)
ˇC
)2}
(4)
Fig. 8. Concept regarding inﬂuenceof response correlation.
3.5. Accident sequence evaluation (Atomic Energy Society of
Japan, 2009)
In cases of needing to evaluate accident sequences, the
sequences are represented by using an event tree (ET) based on var-
ious accident scenarios. The developed fault trees (FTs) that consist
of each event tree are shown in Fig. 5.
Core damage probabilities (CDPs) are evaluated by using ETs,
FTs and by examining the fragilities of components. The CDF is
estimated by multiplying the seismic hazard curve per Gal by CDP
curve, which then corresponds to a semicircular shape area that is
calculated by the integration of seismic motion acceleration (Gal).
3.6. Calculation code for seismic PRA and tsunami PRA
JNES developed the code for evaluating seismic and tsunami
margins based on seismic PRA and tsunami PRA technologies and
called as the calculation code SANMARG (JNES, 2014a,b). SANMARG
has the following main functions.(1) Function of seismic PRA from the above 3.2 to 3.5
(2) Function of tsunami PRA as the same procedure from the above
3.2 to 3.5
 on CDP of failure correlation.
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3) Function considering failure correlation
4) Function of both single unit and multi units
5) Function of both ET/FT analysis and large FT analysis
. Concept and methodology regarding failure correlation
f at multi units and sites
.1. Characteristics of multi units and sites (Ebisawa et al., 2012c)Seismic ground motion inﬂuence on the region is about 150 km
n radius on the seismic hazard of Japan. There are multi units and
ites in the region such as Wakasa region with 14 units and ﬁve
ites in Japan as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 10. Analysis models of rand components.
The standardization of the plant seismic design in Japan has been
advanced. However, under strong seismic motion, it is very likely
that various structures and components at multi units and sites
would fail at the same time.
4.2. Concept regarding failure correlation at multi units and sites
(Ebisawa et al., 2012c)JNES has been studying from the viewpoint of “Correlated Seis-
mic  Motion Methodology”, “Correlation of component’ response in
the buildings at the same site” and “multi-unit and site evaluation
methodology” as shown in Fig. 7.
esponse correlations.
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(1) Event causes initiating event (IE) on unit J: consequential coreFig. 11. Floor response spectra and logarithmic standard deviation.
In addition, it is necessary to determine the “Safety Goal” and
Performance Goal”.Concepts regarding inﬂuence on CDP of failure correlation are
hown in Fig. 8. Failure correlation is deﬁned as the correlation
oefﬁcient Fj, Fk between performance function Fj of component
Fig. 12. Response coefﬁcients between the different damping factors an and Design 288 (2015) 82–97
j in unit J and that of Fk of component k in unit K. Fj and Fk are
represented as follows.
Fj = ln
(
fRj
fCj
)
= lnfRj − lnfCj
Fk = ln
(
fRk
fCk
)
= lnfRk − lnfCk
where fRj and fCj are response and capacity of component j, respec-
tively. fRk and fCk are those of component k. In Fig. 8, CDPJ and CDPK
are CDP of unit J and K, respectively. CDPJ is bigger than CDPK. CDPJK
is overlap area of CDPJ and CDPK. CDP is CDP considered failure
correlation coefﬁcient  between unit J and K.
The right case is dependence (Inclusion) and  is 1 (Complete
subordination). CDPK is involved in CDPJ. CDP is CDPJ in rela-
tionship of union between J and K (OR case). CDP is CDPK in
relationship of intersection between J and K (AND case). The left
case is dependence (Exclusion) and  is −1 (Mutual exclusion).
CDPK is not involved in CDPJ. CDP is CDPJ + CDPK in OR case. CDP
is 0 in AND case. The center case is independence and  is 0 (Com-
plete independence). CDP is CDPJ + CDPK − CDPJK in OR case. CDP
is CDPJK in AND case.
An example of the above left case is relationship between com-
ponent with seismic isolation and that without seismic isolation.
Since each natural period is large separated, response character-
istics of their components are very different. In the components
without seismic isolation, since their response characteristics are
roughly similar, the most realistic case is subordination and  is the
range between 0 and 1. In this case, there are the following three
event causes (Fleming, 2005).damage (CD) on unit J
(2) Event causes initiating event (IE) on unit K: consequential CD
on unit J
d periods at the same lumped mass in the same reactor building.
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3) Multi units IE on unit J and unit K: consequential CD on unit J
and unit K
.3. Methodology for evaluating CDF considering failure
orrelation at multi units and sites
The CDF considering failure correlation at multi units is
xpressed by the following equation. In this report, The CDF rep-
esents target units as two-units (unit j and unit k).
DF =
∫ ∞
0
−dH(∝)
d ∝ · Pjk(˛)d  ˛ (5)
here CDF (1/siteyear) is CDF considering failure correlation
etween unit j and k. H(˛) is seismic hazard (1/year). Pjk (˛) is CDP
onsidering failure correlation coefﬁcient  between unit j and k. ˛
s maximum acceleration at bedrock (Gal).
Pjk(˛) is evaluated by the following equation (Atomic Energy
ociety of Japan, 2009).
jk(˛) = (2)−1(|V|)−1/2
∫ uj
−∞
∫ uk
−∞
exp
{
−1
2
X(˛) · V−1 · X(˛)
}
dxj
·dxk (6)
X (˛) · V−1 · X(˛) = [xj(˛)xk(˛)]
(
1
1 − j,k2
)[ 1 −j,k
−j,k 1
][
xj(˛)
xk(˛)
]
=
(
1
1 − j,k2
)
(xj(˛)
2 − 2j,kxj(˛) + xk(˛)2)
(7)
here X(˛) is horizontal matrix of response (Xj(˛)) and k (Xk(˛)).
(˛) is vertical matrix of (xj(˛) and xk(˛)). uj and uk are maximum
alue of integral interval which is calculated by the median and
ogarithmic standard deviation of the response and capacity. j,k is
ailure correlation coefﬁcient between unit j and k. V is correlation
atrix calculated by jk. V−1 is reverse matrix of V.
The jk obtains the following Eq. (8) (Atomic Energy Society of
apan, 2009; Bohn et al., 1983). In the equation, the ﬁrst item isd periods at the different lumped mass in the different buildings.
correlation of plant response. The second item is correlation of plant
capacity.
j,k =
ˇRj · ˇRk√
ˇ2
Rj
+ ˇ2
Sj
·
√
ˇ2
Rk
+ ˇ2
Sk
· Rj,Rk
+ ˇSj · ˇSk√
ˇ2
Rj
+ ˇ2
Sj
·
√
ˇ2
Rk
+ ˇ2
Sk
· Sj,Sk (8)
where Rj,Rk is the correlation coefﬁcient of response between unit
j and k. ˇRj and ˇRk are the logarithmic standard deviation of
response of unit j and unit k, respectively. Sj,Sk is the correlation
coefﬁcient of capacity between unit j and unit k. ˇSj and ˇSk are the
logarithmic standard deviation of capacity.
4.4. Procedure for evaluating response correlation coefﬁcient and
its evaluation example
4.4.1. Deﬁnition of response correlation (Ebisawa et al., 2012c)
Response correlation is deﬁned as correlation of sympathetic
vibration behavior depending on the frequency characteristics of
input seismic motions and the vibration characteristics of compo-
nents and structures.
4.4.2. Evaluation procedure of response correlation coefﬁcient
(Ebisawa et al., 2012c)
The evaluation procedure and conditions of response correlation
coefﬁcient (CC) are as follows.
(1) Frequency and phase characteristics of input seismic motions:
30 seismic motions are to be set up in various phase and fre-
quency characteristics.
(2) Level of maximum acceleration of input seismic motions:
300 Gal for linear response region and 2000 Gal for non-linear
response region
(3) Target buildings and components: As shown in Fig. 9, reac-
tor building and heat exchange building in which sea water
90 K. Ebisawa et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 288 (2015) 82–97
Table 1
Relationship of response correlation coefﬁcients between ﬂoors levels and periods
under the damping factor 3%.
Period (s) Floor
Same Different
(
(
(
(

w
a
C
4
(
f
b
m
f
a
d
l
(
f
b
f
c
i
(
T
TSame (0.1) 1.0 0.7–0.8
Different (0.02–0.1, 0.1–0.5) 0.6–0.7 0.5–0.6
supply system installed. Major target components are indicated
in Fig. 9
4) Building ﬂoor modeling. Building ﬂoor on which target com-
ponents and structures are installed are modeled as 8 mass in
lumped mass vibration model as shown in Fig. 10.
5) Damping factors of components and structures: 4 value; 1%, 2%,
3%, 5%
6) Evaluation ranges of response spectra: 5 ranges divided by 0.02,
0.05, 0.10,0.15, 0.50 s, as shown in Fig. 11, for each damping
factor
7) Estimation equation of CC (Ri,Rk): estimation equation of CC
(Ri,Rk) is Eq. (9).
Ri,Rk =
Cov(Xi(˛), Xk(˛))
ik
(9)
here Xj(˛) and Xk(˛) are random variables of responses of plant j
nd k response. j and k are standard deviations of Xj(˛) and Xk(˛).
ov (Xj(˛), Xk(˛)) is covariance of Xj(˛) and Xk(˛).
.4.3. Evaluation examples of response correlation coefﬁcient
1) Example of response CCs between the different damping factors
and periods at the same lumped mass in the same R/B
The example of response CCs between the different damping
actors and periods at the same lumped mass in the same reactor
uilding is illustrated in Fig. 12. In this ﬁgure, the target lumped
ass number is the example of No. 2. There are various damping
actors and periods. The response correlation coefﬁcients are shown
s the color values. The CCs in the case of the same lumped mass,
amping factor and period are 1.0 and red values in the diagonal
ines.
2) Example of response CCs between the different damping fac-
tors and periods at the different lumped mass in the different
building
The example of response CCs between the different damping
actors and periods at the different lumped mass in the different
uilding is illustrated in Fig. 13. The response CC between the dif-
erent damping factors and periods at the same building are orange
olor are about 0.7. On the other hand, those at the different build-
ng shows green collar are about 0.3.3) Results of response correlation coefﬁcient
Table 1 summarizes the CC focused on the difference of ﬂoor
levels and natural periods. When two mass points are installed
able 2
arget units and case and step of evaluation.
Case Target units Step
1 Complete independence 
1 BWR-J ET/FT, Large FT 
2  BWR-K
3 BWR-J and K Large FT Fig. 14. Target seismic hazard curve.
on the same level and have the same natural period, CCs are 1.0.
When two mass points are installed on the different level and
have the different natural period, CCs are 0.5–0.6.
As for the change of the correlation coefﬁcient, a few ten-
dencies were seen in the same period though the damping
changed.
4.5. Procedure for evaluating CDF considering failure correlation
at multi units and sites
The procedure for evaluating CDF at multi units and sites con-
sists of two  steps. First step is to evaluate the CDF at a single unit
considering failure correlation. Second step is to evaluate at multi
units and sites based on the single unit evaluation result.
(1) Single unit
The procedure to estimate the CDF of a single unit considering
failure correlation is as follows.
(1) In the case of complete independence, identify the sig-
niﬁcant components which inﬂuence the CDF in F-V
importance analysis.
(2) Out of all the identiﬁed components, select 3 or 4.
(3) Identify response correlation coefﬁcient.
(4) Use them to carry out CDF evaluation considering the failure
correlation.
In the above (2), criterion of cut-off value for selecting 3
or 4 components is over about F-V value 0.2.
(2) Two  or more units
The procedure to estimate the CDF of a multi-unit site consid-
ering failure correlation is as follows.
(1) According to the failure correlation treatment targeting two
units, treatment of more than two  units is similar to that of
two  units.
2 Subordination 3 Complete subordination
ET/FT, Large FT ET/FT, Large FT
Large FT Large FT
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Fig. 15. Example of fragility evaluation of emergency diesel generator.
Fig. 16. Example of fragility evaluation of RCW piping supports.
92 K. Ebisawa et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 288 (2015) 82–97
5
c
5
5
(
(
(
(
5
s
5
E
r
I
o
Fig. 18. Contribution of accident sequences to CDF under complete independent at
BWR-J.
Table 3
Applied accident sequence evaluation approach.
Approach Purpose in this example
Large FT To simplify sequence quantiﬁcation for multi unit evaluation
ET/FT To pick up dominant sequence in single unit
Dominant sequences of each unit are combined and set up into
Large FT for multi unitFig. 17. Evaluation result of CDF under complete independent at BWR-J.
(2) Treatment of more than two units in detail: ﬁrst, evaluate
the CDF of each unit, then select only the units which con-
tribute to total CDF. Next, use F-V importance analysis to
identify the signiﬁcant sequence of the selected units.
(3) Experience so far indicate that 2 or 3 units sufﬁce.
(4) Therefore, limit the number of units to 2 or 3. Then, use a
simpliﬁed model which focuses only on severe sequence.
Consider FC and evaluate CDF.
. Examples of CDF evaluation considering failure
orrelation at multi units
.1. Evaluation conditions
.1.1. Target site and plant, and used data
1) Aim of evaluation
The aim of the evaluation is to identify how the failure cor-
relation between the critical components of inside-building to
each-unit CDF affects the overall CDF of the site having the dif-
ferent type units. So in this example, the failures of the common
facilities (seawater supply systems, off-site power grids, etc.)
between multi units are not considered.
2) Target site and plant
Target site is assumed one in Japan. Target plants were two
different type BWR  units modeled with open information. For
convenience, the units were named as BWR-J and K.
3) Evaluation cases and steps
Table 2 summarizes the evaluation cases and steps. This
example had three cases while each case had three steps. Cases
1 and 2 were to evaluate CDF for single plant while Case 3
was to evaluate CDF combined two units. Step 1 and 3 were
to extract dominant sequences and components in addition to
evaluating CDF with complete independence and complete
subordination. Step 2 was to evaluate CDF with subordination.
4) Used data
The evaluation data are the open data. The practical examples
of the open data will be described in later Section 5.1.3.
.1.2. Seismic hazard evaluation data
The seismic hazard is assumed one in Japan and its curves are
hown in Fig. 14. In the curves, the mean one is the red line.
.1.3. Fragility evaluation data
The fragility evaluation method is based on the Japan Atomicnergy Research Institute (JAERI) method and called as the
esponse factor method (Atomic Energy Society of Japan, 2009).
n the realistic response evaluation, design responses are the
pen data and response factors (median and logarithmic standardTo verify the Large FT method, comparing CDF by ET/FT
approach and Large FT approach in single unit
deviation (LSD) values) are the open data by JAERI (Atomic Energy
Society of Japan, 2009; JNES, 2014a,b). In the realistic capacity eval-
uation, capacity data are the shaking table data by JNES, and their
median and LSD are the open data by JNES (Atomic Energy Society
of Japan, 2009; Suzuki et al., 2010).
The examples of the fragility evaluation results of emer-
gency diesel generators and RCW pipe supports are shown
in Figs. 15 and 16, respectively. It was  important to show
both required and related information, e.g. logarithmic normal
distributions of realistic response and capacity, fragility curves
(mean and some conﬁdence), failure modes and parts, and the
major digital data of such curves.
5.1.4. Failure correlation data
Failure correlation is composed of response and capacity corre-
lations. Response correlation was applied in step 2 (subordination
and complete subordination) with the correlation coefﬁcients ana-
lyzed in chapter 4.
On the other hand, no capacity correlation was  applied and the
correlation coefﬁcient of capacity was  treated as 0. It is the rea-
son that the relationship of capacity correlation between unit j and
k is generally very smaller than that of response treated as to be
independent.
5.1.5. Accident sequence evaluation data
Table 3 summarizes the accident sequence evaluation approach.
The method to evaluate the accident sequence utilizes both large
FT and ET/FT analyses. The former can be used for both case 1 and
2 of a single unit and case 3 of multi units in Table 3. The latter
can be used only within a single unit for case 1 and 2. Authors
recognizes that only former is available to quantify CDF considering
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dFig. 19. Dominant accident sequence s
ailure correlation between multi components at multi units. The
ethod using large Fault Tree in this case is not found in documents
urveyed and seems to be originated by authors. The latter is to
erify the evaluation results of case 1 and 2 by the former.
With large FT method, this study extracts accident sequences,
hich are generally large in multi units. For example, the total
equence number of two units combined is 300 × 300 = 90,000,
hich is hardly realistic to model. Used ETs and FTs were those
f open information. The number of accident sequences was about
00 for each BWR-J and K units. No human operation was applied
uring the earthquake.
Fig. 20. Dominant accident sequences under complete independent at BWR-J(1/2).
5.2. Evaluation of BWR-J unit (case 1)
5.2.1. Step 1 (complete independent)
The seismic hazard, CDP and CDF curves are shown in Fig. 17. The
CDF was 4.7 × 10−6 (1/reactor year). The contribution of accident
sequences to CDF is shown in Figs. 18–20 illustrate the identiﬁ-
cation results of dominant accident sequences and shows as the
red color line the top 10 sequences within the ﬁgures. The total
CDF of top 10 sequences accounted for 91% of the CDF. The most
critical initiating event was  LOSP and accounted for the 90% of the
CDF.
 complete independent at BWR-J (2/2).
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cig. 21. Identiﬁcation results of dominant components by F-V importance analysis
t BWR-J.
The Fussell-Vesely (F-V) importance analysis results are shown
n Fig. 21. Dominant components contributing to the CDF are all
CW piping systems (A and B) and emergency DGs (A and B).
.2.2. Step 2 (subordination and complete subordination)
Based on discussions in Section 5.2.1, failure correlation was
pplied between RCW piping and DGs for all lines (A and B). A part of
he large FT is illustrated in Fig. 22. From discussions in Section 4.4,
ll failure CCs for subordination were set to be 0.5 for combinations
n the same building, different ﬂoor and whose natural periods
ere different. Other conditions were the same as those in Step 1.
Table 4 summarizes the evaluation results in the three failure
orrelations. The tendency of evaluation results are as follows.
Fig. 22. Example of part of laFig. 23. Evaluation result of CDF under complete independent at BWR-K.
(1) Evaluation results by Large FT method matches with those by
ET/FT method.
(2) Complete subordination-based CDF is about 65% of complete
independence-based CDF.
(3) Subordination-based CDF with a failure correlation coefﬁcient
of 0.5 is about 67% of complete independence-based CDF.
5.3. Evaluation of BWR-K unit (case 2)
5.3.1. Step 1 (complete independent)
The seismic hazard, CDP, and CDF curves are illustrated in Fig. 23.
The CDF was 2.0 × 10−6 (1/reactor year). The contribution of acci-
dent sequences to CDF is shown in Fig. 24. The total CDF of top 10
accident sequences accounted for 93% of the CDF. The most crit-
ical initiating event was LOSP and accounted for the 98% of the
CDF.
rge fault tree at BWR-J.
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Table  4
Comparison of evaluation results of CDF at BWR-J.
CDF of BWR-J (1/unit, yr)
Complete independence CDFCI (CC, : 0) Subordination CDFPC (CC, : 0.5) Complete subordination CDFCC (CC, : 1)
Large FT method 4.6 × 10−6 3.1 × 10−6 (CDFPC/CDFCI = 67%) 3.0 × 10−6 (CDFPC/CDFCI = 65%)
ET/FT  method 4.7 × 10−6 3.3 × 10−6 3.2 × 10−6
CC, : correlation coefﬁcient.
F
B
D
R
(ig. 24. Contribution of accident sequences to CDF under complete independent at
WR-K.
The F-V importance analysis results are shown in Fig. 25.
ominant components contributing to the CDF are all
CW piping systems (A, B and C) and emergency DGs
A, B and C).
Fig. 26. Example of part of larFig. 25. Identiﬁcation results of dominant components by F-V importance analysis
at BWR-K.
5.3.2. Step 2 (subordination and complete subordination)
Based on discussions in Section 5.3.1, failure correlation was
applied between RCW piping and DGs for all lines (A, B and C). A part
of the large fault tree is illustrated in Fig. 26. All failure correlation
ge fault tree at BWR-K.
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Fig. 27. Identiﬁcation results of dominant components by F-V importance analysis
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Table 5
Evaluation results of CDF at BWR-K.
CDF of BWR-K (1/unit, yr)
Complete independence CDFCI (CC, : 0)
Large FT method 1.8 × 10−6
From discussions in Section 4.4, all failure CCs for subordinationt BWR-K and BWR-K.
oefﬁcients were set to be 0.5 with the same reason discussed in
ection 4.4. Other conditions were the same as those in Step 1.
Table 5 shows the evaluation results in the complete indepen-
ent. The large FT approach calculated almost the same CDF as the
T/FT approach.
Fig. 28. Example of part of large fauET/FT method 2.0 × 10−6
CC, : correlation coefﬁcient.
5.4. Evaluation of BWR-J and K units (case 3)
5.4.1. Step 1 (complete independent)
This evaluation adopted the top 10 dominant accident
sequences for each unit, i.e. total 20 sequences, derived from
the previous complete independent evaluations. These top 10
sequences dominated over 90% of the CDF for each plant. The CDF
was 5.4 × 10−6 (1/site year).
The F-V importance analysis results are shown in Fig. 27. Dom-
inant components contributing to CDF are all RCW piping systems
and DGs of BWR-J in addition to those of BWR-K.
5.4.2. Step 2 (subordination and complete subordination)
Based on discussions in Section 5.4.1, failure correlation was
applied between RCW piping and DGs for all lines (A, B and C).were set to be 0.3 for combinations on the different building, dif-
ferent ﬂoor and whose natural periods were different. A part of the
large FT in which both plant FTs were connected with an OR gate
lt tree at BWR-K and BWR-K.
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Table  6
Comparison of evaluation results of CDF at BWR-J and BWR-K.
CDF of BWR  – J & K (1/site, year)
CI Sub PC CC
4.8
i
S
t
d
(
(
(
(
(
6
(
(
(
(
(
(
Schroer, S., 2012. An Event Classiﬁcation Schema for Considering Site Risk in Multi-Complete independence CDF (CC,  = 0) 
Large FT method 5.4 × 10−6
s illustrated in Fig. 28. Other conditions were the same as those in
tep 1.
Table 6 summarizes the comparison of the evaluation results in
he three failure correlation conditions, which gave the following
iscussions.
1) In the evaluation of failure correlation effects on CDF of multi
units, BWR-J & K, we used the top 10 sequences of each plant, i.e.
20 sequences, derived from the complete independence condi-
tion which sequences dominate over 90% of each plant’s CDF,
to facilitate the Large FT method. The total sequences used for
the CDF evaluation are about 300 for each BWR-J & K under the
complete independence condition.
2) The total CDF of the top 10 sequences in BWR-J dominates
91% (4.1 × 10−6/reactor year) of total CDF and so is 93%
(1.6 × 10−6/reactor year) in BWR-K. Their relation is “BWR-
J > BWR-K”.
3) The complete independence-based CDF of BWR-J & K
(5.4 × 10−6/site year) matches the sum of the above 91%- and
93%-CDFs for BWR-J and BWR  K, respectively.
4) The complete subordinate-based CDF of BWR-J & K
(3.9 × 10−6/site year), which is about 72% of complete
independence-based CDF, is nearly similar to CDF shown
in the above (2) (4.1 × 10−6/reactor year, BWR-J).
5) Subordination-based CDF with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.3
BWR-J & K (4.8 × 10−6/site year) is about 89% of complete
independence-based CDF.
. Conclusion
This paper is summarized as follows.
1) Authors identiﬁed that external event risk evaluation at the
multi units and sites based on lessons learned from F1-NPP
accident are one of the important issues.
2) Authors proposed the concept and method for evaluating CDF
considering failure correlation at the multi units and sites.
3) Based on the above method, one of authors developed the pro-
cedure for evaluating the failure correlation coefﬁcient and
response correlation coefﬁcient between the multi components
under the strong seismic motion.
4) Authors has applied the above procedure and failure correlation
coefﬁcients to two different BWR  units and evaluated their CDF.
5) Through the quantitative evaluation of effects of correlation on
CDF, in the case of complete independence, subordination and
complete subordination, authors conﬁrmed the validity of the
method.
6) Future plans are to expand the above method into three or more
units and to conﬁrm the effects of failure correlation coefﬁcients
on CDF.ordinate CDF (CC,  = 0.3) Complete subordinate CDF (CC,  = 1)
 × 10−6 (CDFPC/CDFCI = 89%) 3.9 × 10−6 (CDFPC/CDFCI = 72%)
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